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Many studies show the importance of the “earning management and 
its implications” and are focused mainly in developed countries. Only a few 
of them analyses this phenomenon in emerging countries or developing 
economies as it’s the case of Albania. 
This study aims to:  
 bring evidence and analyze earnings management initiatives in 
Albanian context, 
 identify the relationship between earnings management and firm size,  
 provide some conclusion with regard to earnings management. 
Log of total assets is used as proxy for firm size, and absolute value of 
discretionary accruals for earnings management. Jones Model is used for 
calculation of discretionary accruals.  
The results show that firms in the Albanian market are engaged in earnings 
management initiatives and there are no significant differences concerning 
earnings management initiatives and practices, comparing large and small 
size companies. 
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Introduction 
 Annual earning measures the performance of the company during the 
year and is calculated as the net result of revenues and expenses for the fiscal 
year. Managers for various reasons can affect the outcome by intervening or 
"manipulating" the figures, reported. This intervention on the accounting 
earnings by managers is known with the term "earnings management”. 
According to Healy and Whalen (1999:368), “Earnings Management occurs 
when managers use judgment in financial reporting and in structuring 
transactions to alter financial reports to either mislead some stakeholders 
about the underlying economic performance of the company or to influence 
contractual outcomes that depend on reported accounting numbers.” 
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 There are many motives, that drive managers to earnings 
management initiatives. But how defferent companies react and how they 
deffer regarding to earnings management initiatives? 
 Let consider certain viewpoints.  
 Firstly, financial statements of large companies (which fulfill the 
criteria of auditing financial statements) are audited by licensed external 
experts or large audit companies. This process can prevent earnings 
management initiatives that lead to distortion of financial results. Secondly, 
large companies may have greater reputation in the market than smaller 
firms, so they must take into account the costs of lost reputation , which are 
larger compared to smaller firms. This is a good reason for not engaging in 
earnings management initiatives. Thirdly, most of the large companies have 
consolidated structures of internal audit functions. Therefore, they are more 
likely to engage in earnings management initiatives than small firms are. 
 These considerations show that, large firms may be involved less in 
earnings management. On the other hand, it can be considered the contrary.  
 Firstly, large size companies have good relationship with auditors 
(clients with good reputation) and may negotiate with them, making auditing 
process and reports, more flexible. Secondly, managers (owners) by 
exercising their authority can affect the internal audit structures and can 
easily manage the results. Thirdly, large firms can manage earnings to reduce 
political risk. Finally, large size companies tend to enlarge the fiscal profits 
in order to increase external funding. 
 Summing up the above considerations, the question arises: Are there 
significant differences concerning earnings management initiatives, 
comparing large and small size companies in Albanian market?  
 An empirical analysis will serve to answer this question.  
 The content of this paper is organized as follows:  
- Literature review and Hypothesis development. 
- Definition of methodology and sample selection. 
- Specification of the model. 
- Empirical results and discussions. 
Literature review and hypothesis development 
 The effects of firm size on earnings management initiatives. 
 Many studies analyse the effects of firm size on earnings 
management initiatives.  
 Burgstahler and Dichev (1997) analyze the impact of earnings 
management on the company's losses, in a sample of 300 companies and the 
results show that large firms and small ones manage their earnings in order 
to avoid small losses or small profits decline. Rangan, (1998) found a 
significant relationship between earnings management and performance of 
experienced equity offerings. He suggested that older and largest firms were 
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maneuvering the current accruals to exaggerate the earnings of the 
experienced equity offerings. Degeorge, F., J. Patel, and R. Zeckhauser 
(1999) indicated that large companies manipulated the earnings of the 
company to avoid the negative earnings. Barton and Simko (2002), shows 
that big companies faced more influence to get the analysts’ demands to 
manage earnings more effectively.  Nelson et al. (2002) showed that 
sometimes auditors might ignore the earnings management of large sized 
firms. He argue that, since audit fees increase with client size, the probability 
of adjustments in the financial statements by the auditor becomes lower 
when increasing the client size. Ching, Firth and Rui (2002) examined that 
whether unrestricted current accruals forecasted the returns and earnings 
performance and resulted that larger firms were manipulating current 
accruals to overstate earnings than the small sized firms. Kim, Liu and Rhee 
(2003) examined the relationship between corporate earnings management 
and the firm size. They argue that size has a positive effect on the use of 
earnings management because large firms usually have strong internal 
control systems and governance mechanisms. Persons (1995), analysis of 
fraud reveals evidence of more fraudulent activity in smaller firms. 
 Considering the discussion above, a testable hypothesis is developed 
on the effect of firm size on earnings management phenomenon in Albanian 
Market, and it is formulated as below:  
 H – There are no significant differences  regarding to earnings 
management practices comparing large and small size companies. 
Methodology and sample selection 
 Empirical analysis is based on a valid sample of 75 firm-year 
observations. It considers historical data for a three-year period (2009-2011) 
from entities selected, mainly from the private sector. 
 The reason of choosing private companies is that they have greater 
managerial ownership, major capital providers, often have insider access to 
corporate information and capital providers take a more active role in 
management. Moreover, their financial statements are not widely distributed 
to the public and are more likely to be influenced by tax objectives (Ball and 
Shivakumar, 2005). 
 The selection criteria for the companies included in the sample are 
listed as follows: 
- Companies should have financial statements for the period of 2009-
2011. 
- Companies with less than three years of activity are excluded from 
the sample. 
- Consistent with previous research, firms in banking and insurance 
industry are excluded from the sample, because of the different industry 
characteristics. 
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Specification of the model 
 According to Dechow, Sloan, and Sweeney (1995), Modified Jones 
Model provides the most powerful test of earnings management. In addition, 
different authors have defined this model as an efficient tool in the detection 
of abnormal accruals, which shows that companies (managers) involve in 
earnings management practices. Based on these results Modified Jones 
Model is used to detect abnormal accruals, which will be used as a proxy for 
earnings management.  
 Jones Modified Model calculate the discretionary accruals (DA) or 
abnormal accrual (used as a proxy for earning management) as residuals 




So error term determines exactly abnormal accruals, whose absolute 
value is used as an indicator of "earnings management." The larger this 
value, lower is the quality of reported earnings. 
TA = Δ CAit - Δ CLit - Δ Cash it  + Δ STDit – Dep it. This formula is 
used for total accruals calculation where: 
Δ CA  =  the change in current assets from year t-1 to t 
Δ CL  =  the change in current liabilities from year t-1 to t 
Δ Cash = the change in cash and cash equivalents from year t-1 to t 
Δ STD = change in debt included in current liabilities from year 
t-1 to t (which in fact belongs to current liabilities but that is determined by 
any short-term or long-term bank loan, its repayment  ends in the year  t. 
Dep  = depreciation and amortization expense 
A i,t-1 = total assets in the beginning of the year  
Δ Rev  = change in sales from year t-1 to t 
Δ AR = change in receivable accounts from year t-1 to t   
PPE = property plant and equipment 
ε  = statistical error 
 After defining the discretionary accruals, according to the model 
specified above, the regression model used for testing the hypothesis 
developed is as below: 
 DA it    = β1 LnA i,t    +  β2 FL i,t   +  β3  Loss i  + β4 Sales +   β5 FK 
i,t  + e i,t   
 Where: 
 FL i,t        =  financial leverage equal to total liabilities/ total assets.  
      TA it                                   1                     Δ Rev it - Δ AR it                 PPE it 
DA it   =  -------   -   (β0  +   β1t   --------  +  β2t ---------------------------- + β3t  ----------- )   
      Ai,t-1                                Ai,t-1                         Ai,t-1                            Ai,t-1 
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 Loss i,t     = dummy variable to identify negative fiscal earnings 
reported. Loss = 1 if the fiscal earning are negative and Loss = 0, if not. 
 Sales i,t = the percetage of sales growth from the previous year. 
This variable is set in to the model to detect the cases where firms with high 
growth can result in information asymmetry. These situations may lead to 
earnings management initiatives.   
 FK i,t  = if the company’s activity is financed by foreign 
capital, it will increase the demand for audit quality of financial reports. This 
variable will take the value 1 if the   activity is partially or fully, financed by 
foreign capital and zero (0), if the capital is domestic. 
Empirical results and discussions 
 The difference between total accruals scaled to total lagged assets in 
the beginning of the year and accruals according to Modified Jones Model, 
or in other words the error term (in absolute value) is the indicator used to 
identify "earnings management". From estimates (Table 1), these values  
shows that entities in the Albanian market are involved in earnings 
management initiatives. 
Table 1: the absolute values of abnormal accruals according Jones Modified Model 
  
Abnormal Accruals (the residual) 
according Jones Modified Model 
Absolute value of abnormal 
accruals 
firm-year 
observation I II III I II III 
1 -0.09 0.24 0.1 0.09 0.24 0.1 
2 -0.05 -0.14 0.66 0.05 0.14 0.66 
3 -0.19 0.44 0.04 0.19 0.44 0.04 
4 -0.41 0.1 -0.12 0.41 0.1 0.12 
5 -0.04 0.21 -1.7 0.04 0.21 1.7 
6 0.48 0 0.4 0.48 0 0.4 
7 -0.35 -0.13 0.08 0.35 0.13 0.08 
8 -0.31 2.68 0.14 0.31 2.68 0.14 
9 0.06 -0.39 -0.1 0.06 0.39 0.1 
10 -0.04 0.4 -2.96 0.04 0.4 2.96 
11 0.44 0.43 0.44 0.44 0.43 0.44 
12 0.08 -0.55 -0.09 0.08 0.55 0.09 
13 0.56 -0.18 0.01 0.56 0.18 0.01 
14 0.26 0.28 0.39 0.26 0.28 0.39 
15 -0.22 -0.09 -0.4 0.22 0.09 0.4 
16 -0.25 -0.12 -0.18 0.25 0.12 0.18 
17 0.08 0.31 0.21 0.08 0.31 0.21 
18 -0.05 -0.59 0.17 0.05 0.59 0.17 
19 -0.25 0.28 0.23 0.25 0.28 0.23 
20 -0.15 -0.11 -0.17 0.15 0.11 0.17 
21 -0.12 -0.12 0.22 0.12 0.12 0.22 
22 -0.14 -0.05 -0.66 0.14 0.05 0.66 
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23 0.22 0.43 0.25 0.22 0.43 0.25 
24 0.23 0.24 0.2 0.23 0.24 0.2 
25 0.19 0.19 0.17 0.19 0.19 0.17 
 
The results expressed in the table 5 shows that 36 from 75 
observation, which means in 48% there is income decreasing earnings 
management. It seems that companies mostly prefer to manage earnings 
upwards so, they avoid small losses and report small profits instead. 
 The absolute value of DA (as calculated below) is the dependent 
variable in the regression model, used to test the hypothesis developed 
above. 
 Table 2 provide a summary of statistics and analysis of variance, 
regarding the dependent variable and the other variables considered in OLS 
model, using 75 firm-year observations, including 25 cross-sectional units. 
Table 2 (Model 1): Pooled OLS, using 75 observations 
Included 25cross-sectional units 
Time-series length = 3 
Dependent variable: absolute value of discretionary accruals (DA) 
  Coefficient Std. Error t-ratio p-value  
ln_A_it 0.234624 0.0362136 6.4789 <0.00001 *** 
FL_i_t -3.17215 0.570683 -5.5585 <0.00001 *** 
Loss_i 1.46783 0.438651 3.3462 0.00104 *** 
Sales 0.00043849 0.00013947 3.1452 0.00201 *** 
FK_i_t -2.07952 0.475618 -4.3722 0.00002 *** 
 
Mean dependent var  0.884967  Adjusted R-squared  0.342089 
Sum squared resid  609.1152  P-value(F)  5.34e-13 
R-squared  0.359402  Durbin-Watson  0.170071 
F(5, 147)  16.60682    
White's test for heteroskedasticity - 
 Null hypothesis: heteroskedasticity not present 
 Test statistic: LM = 104.57 
 with p-value = P(Chi-square(17) > 104.57) = 1.2565e-014 
 
This model accounts for significantly more variance in the criterion 
variable than would be expected by chance, since the p value of the F (5,147) 
is near 0. In addition, considering the goodness of fit test, it can be observed 
that in the regression model, R squared value of 0.359402 shows that 35.94 
% variation in earning management (Dependant Variable) is explained by 
Firm Size and other independent variables in the model. Furthermore, 
Durbin–Watson statistic used to detect the presence of autocorrelation in the 
residuals (prediction errors) from the regression analysis, stands less than 2 
(Durbin–Watson statistic = 0.170071) indicating that there is evidence of 
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positive serial correlation. While the white test shows that, the 
heteroskedasticity is not present since p-value is near 0 (1.2565e-014).  
 The estimate of the slope coefficient for Ln A is 0.234624 with p 
value less than 0.025. Hence, there is a significant positive impact of firm 
size on earnings management. In addition, the coefficient for Financial 
Leverage is -3.17215, with p value less than 0.025. So it shows for 
significant negative impact on earnings management. This can be explain 
with the fact that, as leverage increases the creditors interest in companies’ 
activities increases, they act as free watchdogs and look after the companies’ 
practices related to earning management. 
 In addition, the estimate of the slope coefficient for  Loss, if  reported 
in the fiscal year and Sales Growth, they are  1.46783 and 0.000438489, with 
p -values less than 0.025, which means that they are also significant variables 
in the model with  positive impact on earnings management.  
 The dummy variable of foreign capital which takes the value 1 if it is 
present, is also statistical significant with negative impact on earnings 
management. Which means that the companies with foreign capital, appears 
to be more careful about the earnings management practices.  
 To test the hypothesis developed in this paper, I have divided the 
observations in to small and big companies, by calculating the average of Ln 
Assets. Than the average of absolute value of discretionary accruals is 
calculated to compare big and small companies, with regard to earnings 
management.  
 The table 3 shows the statistics. 
Table 3 
 
Small companies Ln 
Assets <11.84 
Big companies      Ln 
Assets >=11.84 
Average of Ln Assets  11.84 
Average of DA  0.525 0.906 
 
The larger is the absolute value of discretionary accruals, lower is the 
quality of reported earnings, so larger is the possibility of earnings 
management practices. Comparing the two groups, it is noticed that for big 
companies, the absolute value of discretionary accruals (according Jones 
Modified Model) is bigger (0.906 > 0.525). But how statistical important is 
this difference? To answer this question another dummy variable for firm 
size is added to the regression model.  
 Average LnA i,t     = dummy variable which takes the value 
1, if the natural logarithm of total assets stands above the average value of  ln 
assets, calculated for 75 firm year observations. If the values stands less than 
the average this variable takes the value 0. 
 So the regression model becomes as below: 
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 DA it    = β1 LnA i,t    +  β2 FL i,t   +  β3  Loss i  + β4 Sales +   β5 
FK i,t  + β6 Average LnA i,t  +  e i,t   
 Table 4 provides a summary of statistics and analysis of variance 
regarding the above regression model.  
Table 4 (Model 2): Pooled OLS, using 75 observations 
Included 25 cross-sectional units 
Time-series length = 3 
Dependent variable: absolute value of discretionary accruals (DA) 
  Coefficient Std. Error t-ratio p-value  
LnA_i_t 0.218161 0.0375737 5.8062 <0.00001 *** 
FL_i_t -3.32674 0.576674 -5.7689 <0.00001 *** 
Loss_i 1.40298 0.438582 3.1989 0.00169 *** 
Sales 0.00042303 0.000139118 3.0408 0.00279 *** 
FK_i_t -2.09211 0.473446 -4.4189 0.00002 *** 
Average LnA i,t _ 0.585622 0.377614 1.5508 0.12309  
 
Mean dependent var 0.884967  Adjusted R-squared  0.348276 
Sum squared resid 599.3096  P-value(F)  7.42e-13 
R-squared 0.369714  Durbin-Watson  0.187236 
F(6, 147) 14.37126    
 
As it can be noticed the variable added has a positive impact on 
earnings management but, it appears not statistical significant as the p-value 
is greater than 0.025 and t-ratio is less than 2. So I can conclude that there 
are no significant defferences regarding to earnings management practices, 
comparing large and small size companies. Thus, the hypothesis is 
confirmed. 
Conclusions 
Literature review shows the importance of the earning management 
and its implications, since it has been of concerned by many researchers. 
These studies are focused mainly in developed countries and only a few of 
them analyses this phenomenon in emerging countries or developing 
economies as it’s the case of Albania. This paper investigates the earnings 
management initiatives in the Albanian market and its relations with firm 
size, and other control variables such as leverage, change in sales, foreign 
capital structures, the reported loss. The model is applied on a sample of 75 
firm-year observations, for fiscal years 2009-2011. 
 Through regression model analyses, I find this characteristics: 
 Consistent with Burgstahler and Dichev (1997), I find that that both 
large- and small-sized firms manage earnings to avoid reporting small 
negative earnings or small earnings decreases.  So firstly, there is evidence of 
earnings management initiatives in Albanian market and secondly, there are 
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no differences in regard to earnings management initiatives, where 
comparing large and small size companies.  
 The results from this study could be worthy of being generalized if a 
more variables are taken to study this impact because the R squared value 
suggests the presence of more variables that may have a significant impact 
on earnings management. For example, adding in the model proxies for 
internal and external auditor. Since the quality of reported earnings is subject 
of audit process, it would be of interest to analyze the relation between 
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